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Abstract—This work presents an application of the highly 
expressive Attribute-Based Encryption to implement Secure 
Zones for firearms. Within these zones, radio-transmitted local 
policies based on attributes of the user and the firearm are 
received by embedded hardware in the firearms, which then 
advises the user about safe operations. The Secure Zones utilize 
Attribute-Based Encryption to encode the policies and user 
attributes, and providing privacy and security through it 
cryptography. We describe a holistic approach to evolving the 
firearm to a cyber-physical system to aid in augmenting safety. We 
introduce a conceptual model for a firearm equipped with sensors 
and a context-aware software agent. Based on the information 
from the sensors, the agent can access the context and inform the 
user of potential unsafe operations. To support Secure Zones and 
the cyber-physical firearm model, we propose a Key 
Infrastructure Scheme for key generation, distribution, and 
management, and a Context-Aware Software Agent Framework 
for Firearms. 
Keywords— cyber-physical system; firearm; attribute-based 
encryption; context-awareness; safety; software agent; wireless 
communication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances of digital technologies, as they are incorporated 
into devices for people’s usage, often result in enhancements 
including ease of use, safety, precision, optimizations in 
resource consumption and costs. The trend has produced 
machines heavily dependent on cyber systems; onto these 
machines we rely and happily entrust our lives. Commercial and 
military aircraft and their complex avionics and automatic 
landing procedures; automobiles and their anti-lock brakes and 
collision avoidance systems; health patients surrending their 
well-being to pacemakers, electronic monitors, and robotic 
surgeons. 
One device has persisted largely untouched by cyber 
technology since its inception possibly in the 12th century: the 
firearm. In light of recent tragic mass shootings, communities 
again claim for employing technology to boost firearm safety. In 
this paper, we propose evolving this mechanical device into a 
cyber-physical system for greater safety. In particular, we 
envision applying Cyphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (CP-ABE, [1], [2]) to establish zones within which, 
according to choice, a firearm can alert the user of unsafe 
operation, depending on attributes programmed in the gun’s 
electronics. 
II. THE FIREARM AS CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
With current technology, a firearm could comprise a set of 
sensors enabling it to gather a wide range of information from 
the environment, as well as feedback outputs to the user. A 
software agent inside the firearm can integrate the contextual 
information to form an evaluation of the immediate situation; the 
firearm becomes context-aware. Upon this evaluation, the 
firearm can advise the user of potential unsafe operations 
through visual or haptic feedback. These sensors and feedback 
components are such as microphone, front- and rear-facing 
cameras, accelerometers, haptic and visual feedback, tamper-
proof device containing the cryptography and context software 
agent, and radio antennas. 
III. THE SECURE ZONE 
We visualize a simple, safe schema for realizing safety areas 
for firearm operations within the firearm itself, with the aid of 
digital technologies. In this schema, a Secure Zone comprises 
one or more radio transmitters that will transmit a digital 
message containing the zone’s operation policy for firearms. 
The message consists of an encrypted digital signature together 
with the codification of a firearm operation policy for the zone, 
using CP-ABE. Each Secure Zone will have its own wireless 
transmission with its own encrypted message representing the 
firearm operation policy within that zone. 
Individual firearms receive, at the time of purchase or during 
a registration process, a private key that encodes attributes of 
that firearm and those of the authorized user. Within a Secure 
Zone range, a firearm receives the zone wireless broadcast 
transmission through its radio interface; embedded software 
agent attempts to decode the encrypted message using the 
firearm’s private key. If successful, it means that firearm is able 
to safely operate within that zone; otherwise, the operation is not 
safe, and the firearm’s feedback components will actuate to 
inform the user of such. 
Our approach uses one-way communication, avoiding 
energy-costly two-way communication necessary if the firearm 
had to communicate with the Secure Zone radio to negotiate 
operations or uniquely identify a gun/user. 
IV. KEY INFRASTRUCTURE SCHEME 
This infrastructure uses CP-ABE and builds upon systems 
proposed by [3], [4], [5]. 
A. System Model 
Central Authority (CA): The CA is managed by the 
government (the same branch that regulates firearms), and it is 
trusted. The CA’s responsibility is to issue keys to firearms, 
manage the attribute set 𝒜𝒜 , and register Secure Zone 
Authorities, sending them cryptography parameters. 
Secure Zone Authority (SZA): The SZA is responsible for 
encrypting and wirelessly transmitting Secure Zone messages to 
the users/firearms. An SZA is managed by a zone administrator 
or owner. SZA’s must register with the CA to receive proper 
cryptography parameters. 
Firearms (F): A firearm receives its ABE secret key and 
other security parameters upon registration with the proper 
government branch. This secret key expresses the attributes 
established by the government, according to specific rules that 
consider the firearm and the user/owner. 
B. Scheme Construction and Operation 
System Setup: Central Authority generates its ABE system 
public/master secret key. Generates its own public/private key. 
Securely stores each SZA’s public key and securely sends this 
SZA public key back to the SZA, encrypted with the CA private 
key, generating 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ), where i is the particular SZA. 
Also sends along the system public key and a token authenticator 
algorithm (to prevent replay attacks) and this algorithm’s system 
seed. The Safe Zone Authority: SZA registers with CA, receives 
a set of attributes 𝒜𝒜. Generates its public/private keys. Securely 
sends its public key to CA, receives the system public key from 
the CA and generates 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ). 
User Registration and Secret Key Generation: upon 
registration and user authentication with the government branch, 
a set of attributes 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 will be determined for the user u. The CA 
will generate the firearm/user ABE secret key expressing the 
user attributes (bonded by a random number x to prevent 
colluding) together with the firearm ID, user ID, x and expiration 
time ℯ𝓉𝓉. This key is recorded into the firearm’s TPD, along with 
the token authenticator algorithm, its system seed, and the CA’s 
public key. 
Secure Zone Authority Encrypted Transmission: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
decides on a Secure Zone policy 𝑓𝑓  over the attribute set 𝒜𝒜 . 
Generates token 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 (from token authenticator algorithm) and 
hashes it using standard hashing algorithm; obtains ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉). 
Encrypts ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)  with the SZA private key, generating 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) . Uses the token 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉  as symmetric key to 
encrypt 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉))  together with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) , 
and a timestamp 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉. Uses the ABE system public key to encrypt 
previous result, 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �,𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉), 
per the policy 𝑓𝑓 ; the final result is the message 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . This 
message is broadcast via radio following a certain wireless 
communications standard. 
Decryption, Secure Operation Assessment: a firearm 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
within the range of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 Secure Zone receives, via its antenna, 
the message 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. The software agent applies the decryption 
secret key. If the firearm has the appropriate attribute set 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
such that 𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� = 1, then the decryption is successful, and the 
agent obtains 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �,𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉) . 
Agent runs its own token authenticator algorithm (with the same 
seed as the SZA, recorded at registration), obtains 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑃𝑃. Agent 
uses 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑃𝑃 as symmetric key to decrypt last outcome and get 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) . If 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑃𝑃 ≠ 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 , 
decrypt will fail; stop and alert user. Else, if ℯ𝓉𝓉 < 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 (secret key 
expired), then stop and alert user. Else, use the CA public key 
stored with the agent to decrypt 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) . Use the 
resulting 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  to decrypt 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) ; if final 
product is different than ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑃𝑃) (apply the same standard 
hashing algorithm to 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑃𝑃, compare to ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)), then at least 
one of the previous keys is invalid, or the message is invalid. 
Stop and alert user. Else, firearm is authorized to operate within 
this Secure Zone. If, in the first step, 𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� ≠ 1 , then 
decryption is unsuccessful, resulting in a message of invalid 
format. Stop and alert user. 
The infrastructure will also provide for key revocation and 
expiration, and key update. 
V. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTATION AND FUTURE WORK 
Our initial experimentation focuses on implementing the key 
infrastructure and performing simulations, in which we evaluate 
and demonstrate whether mobile users within secure zones range 
can properly receive and decrypt the messages, if they have the 
appropriate attributes. Our future work involves investigating 
the effectiveness of the proposed security model, and how to best 
address the issues of key revocation and update, as well as its 
performance in light of several attack vectors. Moreover, we will 
augment our model with delegating key generation to the Secure 
Zone Authorities. 
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